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Abstract—Many smartphones now deploy conventional oper-
ating systems, so the rootkit attacks so prevalent on desktop
and server systems are now a threat to smartphones. While
researchers have advocated using virtualization to detect and
prevent attacks on operating systems (e.g., VM introspection and
trusted virtual domains), virtualization is not practical on smart-
phone systems due to the lack of virtualization support and/or
the expense of virtualization. Current smartphone processors do
have hardware support for running a protected environment,
such as the ARM TrustZone extensions, but such hardware
does not control the operating system operations sufficiently
to enable VM introspection. In particular, a conventional op-
erating system running with TrustZone still retains full control
of memory management, which a rootkit can use to prevent
traps on sensitive instructions or memory accesses necessary for
effective introspection. In this paper, we present SPROBES, a
novel primitive that enables introspection of operating systems
running on ARM TrustZone hardware. Using SPROBES, an
introspection mechanism protected by TrustZone can instrument
individual operating system instructions of its choice, receiving
an unforgeable trap whenever any SPROBE is executed. The
key challenge in designing SPROBES is preventing the rootkit
from removing them, but we identify a set of five invariants
whose enforcement is sufficient to restrict rootkits to execute
only approved, SPROBE-injected kernel code. We implemented a
proof-of-concept version of SPROBES for the ARM Fast Models
emulator, demonstrating that in Linux kernel 2.6.38, only 12
SPROBES are sufficient to enforce all five of these invariants.
With SPROBES we show that it is possible to leverage the limited
TrustZone extensions to limit conventional kernel execution to
approved code comprehensively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Kernel rootkits pose a serious security threat because an
adversary that successfully installs a rootkit can control all
user-space processes running on that kernel and can hide from
traditional antivirus software. Rootkits are a common problem
for conventional operating systems, which are large, complex
software systems that may contain many latent vulnerabilities
and which run many processes with full privilege that if
compromised can easily install a rookit.
Many smartphones have now adopted conventional oper-
ating systems to leverage existing functionality and hardware
support. However, this makes rootkits a threat to smartphone
systems as well. For example, CVE-2011-1823 [1] was as-
signed to an integer-overflow bug in a daemon process on
Android 3.0. This bug enables a local adversary to gain root
privilege, which is sufficient to install a rootkit. Thus, it is
likely that rootkits for smartphones will be seen in the wild.
The problem we examine in this paper is whether we can
leverage available smartphone hardware to restrict and possibly
detect rootkits already injected into a running kernel.
To restrict and/or detect kernel rootkits, researchers have
proposed utilizing hardware and software mechanisms, such
as virtualization and secure coprocessors, that have control
over the operating system itself. Using such mechanisms,
privileged operations, i.e., those can affect the actual processor
state, are trapped providing the capability (e.g., by inspecting
trap events) to monitor the operating system activities. For
example, Garfinkel et al. [2] and Chen et al. [3] proposed
using virtualization to monitor running operating systems. A
hypervisor or VMM has visibility into a running operating
system and can control operating system access to hardware re-
sources, such as memory, enabling intrusion detection software
to detect possible attacks, restricting the adversary to attacks
that avoid detection. Many virtualization-based methods have
been proposed to detect possible rootkit behaviors [4], [5],
[6], [7], [8], [9]. In addition, researchers have also proposed
methods to protect the integrity of kernel using VM intro-
spection. SecVisor [10] and NICKLE [11] are two represen-
tative VMM-based solutions that claim to ensure integrity of
kernel code over the system lifetime. However, virtualization
is currently considered to be too expensive for smartphone
systems. Also, coprocessor-based intrusion detection methods
have been proposed [12], [13], where a separate hardware
device with access to host memory can examine that memory
with the aim of detecting rootkit behaviors. A limitation of
coprocessor-based solutions is the coprocessor has a limited
view of kernel state, in particular it cannot access registers of
the host processor. Even the Intel System Management Mode
(SMM) layer has been utilized to explore rootkit detection
methods [14]. However, SMM environment is very resource
limited, making introspection complex, and it is only available
on Intel processors.
Based on the observation that over 95% smartphones now
are using ARM processors [15], we envision that smartphones
need an introspection solution for that hardware. Instead of vir-
tualization extensions, ARM introduced hardware extensions
for security called ARM TrustZone technology [16], [17] in
ARMv6. Intuitively, TrustZone physically partitions all system
resources (e.g., physical memory, peripherals, etc.) into two
worlds: a secure world for security-sensitive resources and a
normal world for conventional processing. TrustZone protects
the secure world resources from the normal world, but the
secure world can access resources in the normal world. This
hardware separation protects the confidentiality and integrity
of any computation in the secure world while permitting the
secure world to view the normal world. One well-known use
case of TrustZone is Apple’s Touch ID. Using TrustZone,
Apple established a trusted path between a fingerprint scanner
and the secure world, which ensures that fingerprint database
is protected from the rest of software [18]. Although the secure
world can be used as a slave easily, making it a master can
be troublesome because each world has full discretion over its
own resources, meaning the normal world can use its resource
(e.g., modify virtual memory settings) without mediation by
the secure world.
In this paper, we utilize the TrustZone extensions to
develop SPROBES, a novel instrumentation mechanism that
enables the secure world to cause the normal world to trap
on any normal world instruction and provide an unforgeable
view of the normal world’s processor state. This property of
SPROBES helps facilitate monitoring over the normal world,
as the secure world can choose the normal world instructions
for which it wants to be notified, receive the current processor
state of the normal world, and perform its desired monitoring
actions before returning control to the normal world. Other
than the placement of instrumentation, SPROBES are invisible
to the normal world, so no changes are required to the
operating system to utilize SPROBES.
We demonstrate SPROBES by developing a methodology
for restricting the normal world’s kernel execution to approved
kernel code memory. To do this, we define a set of five
invariants that when enforced imply that the supervisor mode
of the normal world complies with the W⊕X invariant [19]
for an approved set of immutable kernel code pages, even
if a rootkit has control of the normal world kernel. That is,
adversaries running a rootkit in the normal world cannot inject
new code without detection nor modify kernel code pages. As
a by-product, SPROBES protect themselves from modification,
even from a live rootkit. We show that these invariants can
be enforced comprehensively using only 12 SPROBES for the
Linux 2.6.38 kernel. We find that each SPROBE hit causes
5611 instructions to be executed using the ARM Fast Models
emulator, but that most SPROBES are never hit in normal
execution and those that are hit are either those enforced in
normal VM introspection or account for less than 2% of the
instructions executed.
Contributions. In this paper, we develop a TrustZone-
based solution to restrict the executable memory available to
live rootkits. In particular, we make the following contribu-
tions:
• We present SPROBES, a novel, cross-world instrumen-
tation mechanism that can break on any normal world
instruction transparently. The SPROBES mechanism
enables the secure world to dynamically break into
any normal world kernel routine and specify a trusted
handler in the secure world to mediate that routine.
• We show that SPROBES can be used to restrict normal
world kernel execution to only approved kernel code
pages, even if that kernel is under the control of a
rootkit. We identify five invariants that must be en-
forced and describe a placement strategy for SPROBES
to enforce those invariants for ARM TrustZone archi-
tectures.
• We evaluate SPROBES by applying the placement
strategy to the Linux 2.6.38 kernel running in the
normal world. We find that only 12 SPROBES are nec-
essary to enforce the five invariants comprehensively.
Further, we find that such monitoring can be efficient,
as most SPROBES are not hit in normal operation, and
others account for less than 2% of the instructions
executed or are typically applied by VM introspection.
With SPROBES we show that it is possible to leverage
the limited ARM TrustZone extensions to limit conventional
kernel execution to approved code comprehensively. Effec-
tively, SPROBES enable implementation of the breakpoints
necessary to perform typical VM introspection without a
separate hypervisor layer.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the problem of restricting kernel execution to
approved code pages even when that kernel may be infected
with a rootkit in terms of five invariants. Section III intro-
duces the TrustZone architecture and explains the challenge
of mediating normal world execution from the secure world.
Section IV describes the design of SPROBES, a mechanism
for setting breakpoints for monitoring normal world operating
system execution. We develop a design that utilizes SPROBES
to enforce the five invariants necessary to restrict kernel exe-
cution to approved code pages in Section V. We describe our
implementation for the ARM Cortex-A15 processor emulated
by Fast Models 8.1 emulator in Section VI. We evaluate the
security guarantees achieved and performance overheads in
Section VII. Section VIII presents related work. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. PROBLEM OVERVIEW
Smartphone systems are now deployed on conventional
operating systems, such as Linux or Windows, inheriting both
their functionality and their threats. One significant threat
is that an adversary may be capable of installing a kernel
rootkit, giving the adversary full control of the operating
system’s execution. Conventional operating systems have large
code bases, so latent, exploitable vulnerabilities are likely.
Moreover, these systems have many privileged processes that
all can install a rootkit trivially if compromised. As mentioned
in the Introduction, vulnerabilities in privileged processes in
Android systems have been reported.
A goal of system defenses is to restrict the attack options
available to an adversary. Operating systems now deploy
several defenses, such as W⊕X and address space layout
randomization [20], [19], [21], to prevent adversaries from
using injected code as part of an attack and to increase the
difficulty of guessing the location of existing code pages.
W⊕X limits adversaries to choose to either use a memory
page as data, which can be written, or as code, which can be
executed. If the defender selects only legitimate code pages
as executable, then the adversary can only execute memory
on those pages, limiting the adversaries’ code available for
running exploits. However, even with this limitation, an ad-
versary can still launch attacks that reuse existing code, based
on the idea of return-oriented programming [22] (ROP). ROP
attacks leverage control of the stack pointer to execute exploits
utilizing available code (i.e., set as executable) to implement
the malicious logic. Address space layout randomization aims
to make it impractical for an adversary to guess the correct
address of available code, but an adversary may have means
to extract the correct addresses, such as through information
disclosure attacks [23] to enable launching of effective ROP-
style attacks.
For this problem, we assume that the kernel initially is
enforcing W⊕X over an approved set of kernel code pages1,
but that an adversary may still be capable of executing some
form of a ROP attack to launch their rootkit. We observe that
rootkits could compromise the integrity of kernel execution in
the following ways. First, as W⊕X is the common technique
used by the kernel to prevent code injection attacks, a rootkit
can simply disable the W⊕X protection. For ARM processors,
such as those used by most smartphones, this is done by
disabling the Write eXecute-Never (WXN) bit. When the WXN
bit is set, writable pages are never executable, regardless of
how the page table is configured. In this case, we assume that
the kernel has the WXN bit set initially, but a rootkit may
execute existing code, if available, to disable that protection,
enabling the rootkit to inject code in the kernel.
Second, to bypass the W⊕X protection, rootkits can modify
page table entries. Suppose the adversary wants to modify a
code page, which is initially read-only. Firstly, she alters the
permission bits of that page from executable to writable, as
they are mutually exclusive. Then, she may write to that page
arbitrarily. Then, she changes the permission of that page from
writable to executable, as if nothing has ever happened.
Third, an alternative approach from modifying page table
entries in place is to duplicate a page table elsewhere and reset
the page table base (e.g., TTBR on ARM and CR3 on x86).
Following similar steps of the second approach, i.e., mark a
page as writable and revert it to executable once the write is
complete, the adversary would be able to inject kernel code.
Fourth, if the adversary can disable the MMU, she can
bypass all the existing memory protections (e.g., page permis-
sion and W⊕X) as all of them are based on virtual memory
system. Note that disabling MMU can limit what a rootkit
can do as well. Disabling the MMU reduces the adversary
to utilizing physical memory addresses, and she may not
know the physical memory addresses of code necessary to
continue her ROP attack. However, if the operating system
maps the virtual addresses of kernel space to the exactly same
physical addresses, the rootkit could benefit from disabling
MMU without limiting its capabilities.
Lastly, an adversary may direct the kernel to execute
instructions in user space instead. Since an adversary often
controls user space (e.g., a root process) prior kernel ex-
ploitation, she can simply prepare the malicious instructions
there and invoke them from kernel. This is possible because
most operating systems (e.g., Linux) map kernel space and
user space into one unified virtual address space, and page
permissions are set in such a way that the kernel space has a
one-way view of the user space.
To summarize, we cast the problem into the following
security requirements:
1Note that even code pages may have read-only data embedded in them.
• S1: Execution of user space code from the kernel must
never be allowed.
• S2: W⊕X protection employed by the operating sys-
tem must always be enabled.
• S3: The page table base address must always corre-
spond to a legitimate page table.
• S4: Any modification to the page table entry must be
mediated and verified.
• S5: MMU must be kept enabled to ensure all existing
memory protections function properly.
III. BACKGROUND: TRUSTZONE ARCHITECTURE
TrustZone [16] is a set of security extensions first added
to ARMv6 processors. Its goal is to provide a secure, separate
environment that protects the confidentiality and integrity of
critical computation from conventional computation. Trust-
Zone partitions both hardware and software resources into two
worlds - the secure world for assets that are security-sensitive
and the normal world for conventional processing.
The TrustZone hardware architecture is illustrated as Fig. 1.
The processor core implements the two separate worlds, i.e.,
the normal world and the secure world. And it can be in one
world at a time, meaning the two worlds are running in a time-
sliced fashion. To maintain the processor state during the world
switch, TrustZone adds a monitor mode, which resides only in
the secure world. The software in the monitor mode ensures the
state of the world (e.g., registers) that processor is leaving is
saved, and the state of the world that processor is switching to
is correctly restored. This procedure is similar to context switch
between processes except there are some banked registers
that are not required to be saved. The mechanisms by which
the processor can enter monitor mode are tightly controlled.
Interrupts can be configured to be handled in either the normal
world or the secure world. In addition, the normal world may
proactively execute a Secure Monitor Call (SMC), which is
a dedicated instruction that can trigger the entry to monitor
mode (i.e., the secure world). For ease of understanding, the
SMC instruction is similar to “int 0x80” on Intel x86 and “svc”
on ARM in terms of privilege mode switch.
Fig. 1: TrustZone hardware architecture (from Figure 3.1 in
[16])
The current world in which the processor runs is deter-
mined by the Non-Secure (NS) bit. In addition, almost all the
system resources (e.g., memory, peripherals) are tagged with
their own NS bits, determining the world they belong to. A
general access control policy enforced by TrustZone is that
the processor is able to access all the resources when running
in the secure world, while it can only access normal world
resources (i.e., those with the NS bit set) when running in the
normal world. For example, memory hardware is partitioned
into the two worlds. When the processor is in the normal world,
it can only see the physical memory of its own world. After
entering the secure world, the processor can see all the physical
memory in the system.
Unfortunately, the secure world as provided by the Trust-
Zone architecture does not help much on protecting the
kernel running in the normal world from rootkits. Unlike
a VMM, the secure world is not more privileged than the
normal world regarding the normal world resources. Once
a hardware resource is assigned to the normal world, the
secure world cannot control its access (e.g., by managing all
physical memory, as a VMM would). For instance, the normal
world has full privilege over its memory system, meaning
it can arbitrarily set its virtual memory environment (i.e.,
virtual address mappings and page permissions) and access
its physical memory without requiring any permission from
the secure world. Another example is that interrupts assigned
to the normal world are handled locally, without any secure
world code being executed. By relinquishing this control to
the normal world, rootkits can then tamper with the normal
world’s virtual memory environment as stated in Section II
without being detected by the secure world.
IV. SPROBES MECHANISM
To enable the secure world to control the execution of
normal world events of its choice, we present SPROBES, an
instrumentation mechanism that can transparently break on any
instruction in the normal world. The control flow of an SPROBE
is shown in Fig. 2. When an SPROBE is hit, the secure world
immediately takes over the control, switches the context and
invokes the specified SPROBE handler. The processor state of
the normal world (e.g., register values when SPROBE is hit)
is packed as a structure and passed to the invoked handler.
Since this parameter cannot be forged by the normal world,
the handler obtains a true view of the normal world from it.
Finally, the control returns to the location where SPROBE is
hit.
Fig. 2: SPROBE control flow
To trigger the secure world from a normal world instruc-
tion, we rewrite the specified instruction in the normal world as
illustrated in Fig. 3. In this example, a secure world process
(called a “trustlet”) inserts an SPROBE at the normal world
instruction of “mov pc, lr” (e.g., return from a function) by
rewriting it to be the SMC instruction. The SMC instruction
is the only instruction for triggering entry to the secure world
as stated in Section III. Although code pages in the normal
world might be write-protected, the secure world may rewrite
any normal world instruction without causing an exception
because the secure world has a different translation regime.
This means all the virtual memory protections (e.g., W⊕X)
employed in the normal world are not applicable to the secure
world. The secure world is authorized to access all physical
memory without intervention of the normal world virtual
memory system. Later, when the SPROBE is hit, meaning the
program counter reaches the SMC instruction, the processor
state will be switched to the secure world immediately. Within
the secure world, the SPROBE handler is invoked, which can
perform monitoring operations such as checking the state
of the normal world kernel prior to restoring the original
instruction, i.e., “mov pc, lr”, that was substituted by the SMC
instruction. Lastly, the processor exits the secure world and
resumes execution starting from the restored instruction.
There are several advantages of the SPROBES mechanism.
First, it is independent on the software running in the normal
world. All the features used by SPROBES are natively provided
by the ARM hardware, such as the SMC instruction and
cross-world memory access. Second, an unforgeable state of
the normal world can also be extracted from its hardware
registers directly when an SPROBE is hit. Third, SPROBES
are transparent to the normal world and thus do not require
modifications to existing software. The original control flow
in the normal world remains unchanged, so the operating
system running in the normal world will not notice any overt
differences caused by SPROBES. Fourth, SPROBES can break
on any instruction in the normal world without any restrictions.
This is because SPROBE does not cause any side effects on the
normal world. Fifth, other than the SMC instruction, SPROBES
are implemented in the secure world, so all of its code and
data are isolated from the normal world. This limits the
ability of a rootkit to affect any SPROBE execution. All these
features combine to make SPROBES a powerful instruction-
level instrumentation mechanism on TrustZone architecture.
V. PROTECTING INTEGRITY OF KERNEL CODE
In this section, we propose an SPROBE placement strategy
that can block all the approaches by which an adversary
could violate the integrity of kernel code. With this placement
strategy, we make a strong security guarantee that over the
system’s lifetime, any kernel rootkit cannot inject any code
or modify approved kernel code. That is, even a rootkit in the
normal world kernel is limited to running approved kernel code
only. Further, since the SPROBES are inserted into kernel code,
this placement strategy is sufficient to protect the SPROBES
from modification as well.
Attacker Model. According to the problem stated in
Section II, we base our work on the following attacker model.
We assume there is at least one exploitable vulnerability in the
kernel by which an adversary could hijack the control flow of
Fig. 3: World switches during SPROBE hit
the kernel, enabling that adversary to choose the address from
which to run kernel code, such as return-oriented programming
(ROP) attacks [22]. Defenses have been proposed that aim to
reduce the adversaries’ ability to leverage such attacks, such
as address space layout randomization [19], [20]. In addition,
researchers have proposed methods to counter ROP attacks,
such as modifying the compiler to build a kernel without return
instructions [24] and using VMM to enforce some degree
of kernel-level control flow integrity [25], but these proposal
still have some important limitations. Thus, we aim to limit
adversaries with an installed rootkit to run only approved
kernel code even though they may be capable of launching
ROP-style attacks.
Trust Model. In this paper, we make the following as-
sumptions. In addition to trusting all the secure world code,
we make the assumption that the normal world kernel code is
free of rootkits prior to the execution of the first user-space
process. That is, we assume that all rootkit threats originate
from compromised root processes or any user-space process
that has access to a kernel interface. We do not defend against
malicious code running in the kernel prior to the first user-
space process being initiated. In addition, we assume the use
of hardware-based IOMMUs [26] to block malicious DMAs.
Lastly, we trust the load-time integrity of kernel image is
protected by utilizing technologies such as secure boot [16],
[27].
Placement Strategy Overview. At a high-level, our strat-
egy is for the secure world to configure the normal world
kernel such that the SPROBES can mediate runtime access
to memory management. This strategy combines enforcement
of high-level management settings for ARM (e.g., keeping
W⊕X enabled to enforce S2 and keeping the MMU enabled
to enforce S5) with VMM-like breakpoints to control kernel
memory access (e.g., verifying page table integrity to enforce
S3 and validating page table updates to enforce S4), lever-
aging an ARM hardware feature to prevent the execution
of user-space code from supervisor mode (e.g., to enforce
S1). This strategy is implemented in three phases. First, the
secure world must configure the kernel for booting in such
a way that invariants S1− S5 are satisfied initially (see Pre-
boot Configuration below). Second, the kernel must ensure
configuration of certain memory protections prior to running
the first user-space process (see Boot Configuration below).
Third, we describe how to place SPROBES such that they can
implement policies necessary to enforce the invariants S1−S5
throughout the kernel runtime (see Enforcing S1-S5 below).
Pre-boot Configuration. We require that the secure world
has some specific knowledge about the normal world kernel
memory in order to establish the enforcement of S1-S5 prior
to booting. First, the secure world must know the base address
that will be used for the kernel page table necessary to enforce
S3. Second, the secure world must know the kernel code
pages (see Approved Kernel Code below) in this page table,
so it can validate the page table mappings (see Enforcing
S3 below for the method), such as checking the correct
page permissions necessary to enforce S4. Third, the secure
world must write-protect the kernel page table to continue
enforcement of S4. Other invariants will be established after
booting the kernel.
Approved Kernel Code. In addition, the secure world must
know that all of code page memory regions for the normal
world kernel are approved for execution prior to booting.
One issue with this assumption is that many kernels support
loadable kernel modules (LKM), which may change the code
in the kernel legitimately. However, for smartphones, LKM is
not necessary because all the peripherals are known in advance
and their drivers can be compiled along with the kernel. The
Android 4.3 kernel on Nexus 4 is an example of a kernel where
LKM is not supported. An alternative approach is to intercept
init module system call by inserting an SPROBE and record
the memory location where module instructions are loaded.
In addition, kernel modules may include security-sensitive
instructions that may require SPROBE mediation as well. Thus,
we assume that LKM is not supported in the normal world
kernel and leave the more general problem for future work.
Boot Configuration. Once the normal world kernel is
booted then further work is necessary to establish invariants
S2 and S5. We require that W⊕X is set (S2) and the MMU is
enabled (S5) prior to running the first user-space process. These
are typically set early in the boot sequence, and SPROBES are
placed to mediate access to these values as described below. If
they are not set prior to changing the page table base value for
the first time, indicating that a new process is running, then
the secure world can halt the system. We note that although
preventing the execution of user-space code in supervisor mode
(S1) is not relevant until the first new process is initiated, we
require the operating system to set the Privileged eXecute-
Never (PXN) bit2 on all user-space pages before actually
context switching to the first user-space process.
Security Guarantees. Using the above SPROBE placement
strategy, we expect to obtain the information necessary to
enforce invariants S3 and S4 over the kernel prior to boot,
configure enforcement of S2 and S5 prior to running the first
user-space process, and enforce S1 (prevent the kernel from
running unprivileged code), S3 (enforce correct page table base
addresses for the kernel and all processes), and S4 (prevent
unauthorized modifications of the page table entries) over the
kernel and user-space processes at runtime. We describe our
approach to placing SPROBES to achieve these guarantees in
the rest of this section.
Enforcing S2. As the WXN is a bit in the System Control
Register (SCTLR), the rootkit would have to write to this
register in order to turn off W⊕X protection. Recall that
we assume that the WXN bit is set at initialization time.
Therefore, the idea is if we could insert an SPROBE at every
kernel instruction that writes to the SCTLR, we can trigger the
secure world whenever a rootkit may attempt to turn off the
protection. When such an SPROBE is invoked, it simply must
block values that attempt to unset WXN to achieve S2. Since
ARM has fixed length instructions, finding such instructions
in the kernel binary is straightforward, particularly relative to
x86.
One issue is that there are multiple control bits in the
SCTLR, such as Alignment Check Enable and MMU Enable.
This causes false sharing as updating a non-WXN bit in
the SCTLR will also hit the SPROBE and trigger the secure
world thus bring unnecessary overheads. We evaluate the
performance impact of false sharing in Section VII.
Enforcing S5. Our solution does not insert additional
SPROBES to prevent adversary from disabling the MMU. That
is because the MMU Enable bit is in the same register, i.e.,
the SCTLR, as the WXN bit. All the SPROBES used to protect
the WXN bit can also protect the MMU Enable bit. Therefore,
S5 is satisfied. Given the fact that most operating systems do
not disable MMU after it is turned on, it would be easy for
the secure world to detect the presence of a rootkit if she tries
to override the MMU Enable bit.
Enforcing S3. On ARM processors, the base address of
page table is stored in a special register called Translation
Table Base Register (TTBR). Similarly to above, by inserting
an SPROBE at each instruction that writes to the TTBR, the
secure world can fully mediate the operations that switch the
page table, providing complete mediation of writes to this
register.
Normally, to create separate address spaces for each pro-
cess, the operating system assigns a different page table to
each process. When a process is scheduled on processor, the
operating system updates the TTBR with that process’s page
table base address. Thus, the secure world needs to be capable
of ensuring that only valid page table bases are applied for each
context switch. In order to do this, the secure world will have
to maintain the integrity of the page tables. When a TTBR
is asserted for the first time, the secure world must validate
2The PXN bit is a permission bit in page table entries that determines
whether a memory region is executable from privileged modes
this new page table, ensuring that the addresses used are valid
and checking compliance of the permission bits. For example,
in Linux the kernel portion of the process’s page table (i.e.,
addresses above 0xc0000000) must be the same for each
process page table and the approved kernel code pages must
not be writable. In addition, double mapping (i.e., two virtual
pages are mapped to the same physical frame) must not exist in
the page table [28], particularly between a code page and a data
page, otherwise the attacker can modify kernel code by writing
to that data page. By restricting updates of TTBR to only valid
page tables, we enforce invariant S3. Note that we only need to
validate a page table the first time that we see its TTBR value
because of the way we control page table updates to enforce
S4 below. Note further that unlike protecting the WXN bit, the
SPROBES to protect the TTBR will be hit in a regular manner
due to process context switch. As a result, some performance
overhead is fundamental to this enforcement.
Enforcing S4. Placing SPROBES to prevent the page table
from being modified illegally by rootkits is the most chal-
lenging part in our solution. Unlike the cases above, which
focus on mediating access to a special register, page tables are
just normal memory, so consequently there are many usable
instructions that can write to them. Inserting SPROBES at all
of those instructions (e.g., store) is not practical because of
performance overhead. But why do we want to instrument all
memory store instructions if what we really want is to monitor
updates to page tables, which are only a small portion of
the whole address space? Therefore, instead, we apply write-
protection over page tables, so that any table updates will
generate a page fault. Then, if we insert an SPROBE into the
page fault handler, the secure world will be triggered upon
every table update. This is essentially how shadow page tables
are implemented in virtualization, but we need to implement
this mechanism utilizing ARM hardware.
Unlike Intel x86, ARM requires operating system to
place its exception vector table at a fixed location, either
0x00000000 or 0xffff0000, determined by Vectors bit in
the SCTLR. Normally operating systems use 0xffff0000
as the exception base address because 0x00000000 is in-
terpreted as NULL pointers. Because of this, the rootkit will
not be able to re-define another exception vector table to
bypass the SPROBE in the page fault handler. It is also worth
noting that exception vectors are code rather than data, so
they cannot be written by a rootkit without changing the code
page permissions, which is what this SPROBE enforces. Each
vector contains an instruction (normally a branch instruction),
and the instruction is executed once a corresponding exception
happens (e.g., page fault). To illustrate, we show an example
of exception vector table in assembly code as Listing 1. For
this listing, we propose to insert an SPROBE at the start of
the function abort_handler, which services page faults.
Therefore, given that the adversary can neither re-define a new
exception vector table, nor modify the current one, updates to
the normal world’s page tables are fully mediated by the secure
world.
When the secure world is triggered due to a page fault in
the normal world, there are three situations worth discussing,
and the flow chart of SPROBE handling is shown as Fig. 4.
First, if the page fault is intended such as due to copy-on-
write fork, we simply return to the exception handler to let
Listing 1: Exception Vector Table
; we are at 0xffff0000 now
exception_vector_table:
reset:
b init ; system boots
undefined:
b undefined
supervisor:
b syscall_start ; system call
prefetch_abort:
b abort_handler ; page faults
data_abort:
b abort_handler ; page faults
unused:
b unused
irq:
b irq_handler ; interrupts
fiq:
b fiq ; not used
the kernel deal with this exception. Second, if the page fault
is caused by a legitimate table update like mmap system call,
the secure world would first emulate the behavior of table
update and then return to the faulted instruction as if nothing
happens. By returning to the instruction that causes the page
fault instead of the next instruction in the exception handler,
we make the whole procedure invisible to the operating system
since it does not expect such an exception. Third, if the page
fault is caused by either (1) making a page writable that maps
to a physical frame containing kernel code, or (2) making a
page executable that maps to any other physical frame, the
secure world should block such page table modifications and
trigger rootkit detection mechanisms. Therefore, S4 is satisfied.
Enforcing S1. Since all page table entries are protected
from modification by enforcing S4, the PXN bits set prior
to the installation of rootkit are safe from modification and
the secure world can prevent the rootkit from creating new
mappings in which the PXN bits are unset. In addition, S3 can
reject a page table whose PXN bits are not properly set for
new page tables, even those created by a compromised kernel.
Thus, all the page tables must have the PXN bits set for all
user-space pages, satisfying S1.
We enforce all five of these invariants by mediating a fixed
set of instruction types. An implicit assumption behind our
design is that the rootkit cannot jump into the middle of an in-
struction to discover unintended sequences. Fortunately, ARM,
like most other RISC machines, does not support misaligned
instruction fetch, defeating this possibility completely.
In summary, by enforcing invariants from S1 to S5, we
mediate all the ways that a party, either the legitimate kernel
or a malicious adversary, controls the system’s virtual memory
environment. S5 ensures the MMU is always on, which serves
as a foundation for the rest of protections. S3 further limits the
usable page tables to a small set, preventing the adversary from
setting the page table base to an arbitrary value. S4 protects
the integrity of page table entries, thwarting any attempts to
modify kernel code and thus protecting the SPROBES from
unauthorized removal. As a supplement, S1 and S2 disallow
execution over injected instructions and assure the enforced
Fig. 4: SPROBE handling on data abort
mediation is not bypassable. Overall, the five invariants restrict
the adversaries to approved code pages, indirectly protecting
any SPROBES inserted into these pages for enforcement pur-
poses.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We implement a prototype of SPROBES on top of a Cortex-
A15 processor emulated by Fast Models 8.1 emulator [29]
from ARM. Although SPROBES do not rely on the software
(e.g., kernel) running in the normal world, to have a proof of
concept of our solution, we run Linux 2.6.38 in the normal
world as a case study. We build Linux from source code using
the GNU ARM bare metal toolchain (e.g., arm-none-eabi).
This toolchain is mainly for building applications for the ARM
architecture without any operating system support. To make
the SPROBES implementation simpler and more efficient, we
extract all the necessary kernel information before hand. For
example, we use objdump to inspect the address space layout
of kernel code to identify the locations for SPROBES.
One key step in SPROBES implementation is to substitute
the target normal world instructions with SMC instructions.
In most cases, the MMU is enabled in the normal world, so
the secure world can only see its virtual addresses. To access
a given virtual address in the normal world, the secure world
needs first to translate it to the physical address and then create
a corresponding mapping in its own page table. Note that the
physical address space of the two worlds can overlap, so the
page table entry has an NS bit to indicate which world the
physical address is from. To convert a virtual address to a
physical address, the Cortex-A15 architecture has an external
coprocessor (CP15) that can complete such a translation, which
avoids manually walking the page table in the normal world.
In order to enforce W⊕X protection, we disassemble the
text section of kernel image and identify all instructions that
write to the SCTLR. Then, in the secure world, we hardcode
the addresses of those instructions and insert SPROBES after
the Linux kernel is loaded in the normal world.
Similarly, to protect the TTBR, we scan the disassembled
text section of kernel image and record all instructions that can
write to the TTBR. However, ARM processors support more
than one page table active (two in maximum) at a time, and
one is determined by the TTBR0 while the other is determined
TTBR1. The TTBRs are used together to determine addressing
for the full address space. Which table is used for what address
range is controlled via the Translation Table Base Control
Register (TTBCR). In the actual implementation of Linux, by
setting the TTBCR to a fixed value, it uses only one page
table throughout its lifetime. However, to prevent adversary
from enabling the second page table, we still need to insert
SPROBES at those instructions that write to the TTBCR.
Protecting the page table requires the secure world to
modify page permissions of the normal world. As stated in
Section V, the secure world sets the page table memory to be
read-only, so that any page table updates cause page faults.
The implementation is actually similar to the mechanism to
synchronize guest page tables and shadow page tables that
are used by the VMM [30], [31]. Since we also insert an
SPROBE to the page fault handler, the secure world would be
triggered on every page fault. The chain connecting the page
table updates to the secure world does not give the normal
world software any opportunity to interfere with this function,
as none of the normal world instructions can be executed in the
middle. This requires us to insert an SPROBE at the very first
instruction of the exception handler. There are two benefits
by doing so: (1) it ensures no normal world instruction is
executed before the secure world gains the control and (2) in
those cases where the operating system does not expect such
a page fault (e.g., mmap system call), it minimizes the effects
on the processor state of the normal world and thus makes
state recovery (i.e., restore the register values before the page
fault) easier.
VII. EVALUATION
A. Security Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the security of our solution
by summarizing how our design has achieved the goal of
protecting kernel code integrity for Linux 2.6.38.
For illustration, we list the 12 SPROBES necessary to
implement the placement strategy for Linux 2.6.38 in four
groups:
• Type #1: The 6 SPROBES that protect the SCTLR
containing the WXN and MMU Enable bit.
• Type #2: The 4 SPROBES that protect the TTBR
containing the base address of the page table.
• Type #3: An SPROBE that protects the TTBCR to
enforce usage of only one TTBR (i.e., TTBR0), as
required by Linux.
• Type #4: The SPROBE that is inserted at the first
instruction of the page fault handler.
At a high level, we demonstrate our design can effectively
reduce the adversary to approved kernel code following these
steps. We first show that the adversary has to change the
memory environment, in order to execute injected or modified
code in kernel space. Then, we illustrate how the combination
of listed four types of SPROBES enables the secure world to
detect all changes to the normal world memory environment.
Finally, we claim that no memory environment changes for a
malicious purpose can bypass the checks in the secure world.
First, according to the Boot Configuration in Section V,
the only possible attack against the integrity of kernel code
without tampering with the virtual memory environment is to
modify the kernel image file, so that the system would be in a
“compromised” state the next time it is loaded into memory.
We foil such attacks by utilizing technologies like secure boot
[16], [27] as assumed in the Trust Model in Section V. Note
that checking the integrity of kernel image file is sufficient to
ensure load-time kernel integrity as kernel loading is at the
very beginning of a boot sequence, before which no adversary
is assumed to have access to the system.
Second, we claim that modifying the virtual memory envi-
ronment will always be captured by the secure world regardless
of its purpose. In essence, a virtual memory environment is
uniquely defined by the active page tables as long as the MMU
is on3. So, if not considering the cases where the MMU is
disabled, modifying the virtual memory environment is just
equivalent to modifying the active page tables. To accomplish
this, the attacker may either (a) switch to a set of page tables
that are under her control or (b) modify page table entries in
place. However, (a) would cause the hit of Type #2 and/or
Type #3 SPROBES while (b) triggers Type #4 SPROBES since
page tables are write-protected. Alternatively, the attacker can
simply disable the MMU, accessing physical memory with no
restrictions. Similarly, such operation will be trapped to the
secure world as well because of Type #1 SPROBES.
Finally, we show that altering the virtual memory environ-
ment for a malicious purpose will not bypass the checks in
the secure world. To achieve this, we need to draw a clear
boundary between legitimate and malicious operations on the
memory settings. To begin with, triggering Type #1 SPROBES,
either by disabling the MMU or the W⊕X protection, is a clear
indication of system compromise in the normal world because
generally an operating system (e.g., Linux) will not turn any
of them off after they are on. When modifying the active page
tables either by (a) or (b), triggering Type #2/#3 or Type #4
SPROBES, we enforce the same permission settings as shown
in Fig. 5: consisting of non-executable kernel data, unwritable
kernel code, and non-executable user pages. Any attempt to
violate this configuration will be regarded as a malicious
operation. Further, in order to ensure that physical kernel
code frames are protected by managing the permission settings
on virtual pages, we ensure that there is a fixed one-to-one
mapping between kernel code pages and their corresponding
physical frames. In addition, by forbidding double mappings,
we rule out the possibilities of modifying a physical code frame
through a virtual data page, the combination of which ensures
only a set of unmodified physical frames have been executed
since system starts, which is our goal in this paper.
3Though the permission settings can be enhanced through bits like
SCTLR.WXN.
Fig. 5: Normal world virtual memory layout
B. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance impact of
SPROBES on the normal world execution. The limitation of this
performance evaluation our proof-of-concept was implemented
on the Fast Models emulator, but Fast Models does not model
accurate cycle counts, instead tracking instruction counts.
For example, arithmetic operations (e.g., add) and memory
accesses (e.g., load) all take the same amount of time, one
instruction. This makes running benchmarks on Fast Models
meaningless, as the perceived overheads of software running
on the model differs from real-world software.
To obtain a general understanding of how much overhead
SPROBES incur, we count the number of instructions instead.
An SPROBE hit causes 5611 more instructions (including the
original SMC instruction) to be executed in the secure world.
Note that the number of instructions is a very coarse-grained
measurement as it does not take microarchitectural events into
account.
We run Linux 2.6.38 in the normal world with 28 startup
processes including 4 daemon processes, 1 interactive process
and 23 kernel threads. We run a shell script that invokes the
write system call in a loop as the workload. We measure the
individual cost for SPROBES of the four different types. To
understand how frequently those SPROBES are hit in Linux
2.6.38, we use hit frequency, the average number of elapsed
instructions between two consecutive hits, as the metric. We
list our results in Table I. Both Type #1 and Type #3 SPROBES
are not hit after the booting, which means enforcing S2, S3 and
S5 incurs negligible runtime overheads. Type #2 SPROBES are
hit on each context switch. On average 313,836 instructions
are executed between each Type #2 SPROBE hit, contributing
to 2% of the instructions executed. We further measure the
Type #4 SPROBES during boot stage when page updates are
the most intensive. The result turns out Type #4 SPROBES are
hit in every 22,424 instructions. After the kernel is setup, the
hit frequency goes down to every 85,982 instructions.
Since smartphone boot-times can be performance-critical,
SPROBES overhead may be an issue. Perhaps restricting the
code executed at boot-time to only trusted code is necessary
to achieve performance goals. However, this may introduce a
window of attack for adversaries. Normal runtime overheads
incurred by SPROBES may be close to acceptable for the
protection offered, given that only 2 types of SPROBES are
hit and incur fewer than 10% of the instructions executed. We
note that current VM introspection methods trap all page faults
as well, so the number of traps would be the same, although
the overhead for TrustZone may be higher.
SPROBE Type #1 #2 #3 #4
Hit Frequency N/A 313,836 N/A 85,982
TABLE I: Hit frequency of different types of SPROBES
Revisiting the false sharing issue stated in Section V, the
fact that Type #1 SPROBES are never hit after initialization
demonstrates that false sharing can be eliminated to an ac-
ceptable range in a real implementation.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The main focus of this paper is to enforce kernel code
integrity. SecVisor [10] and NICKLE [11] are two VMM-
based approaches proposed to protect lifetime kernel code
integrity. SecVisor is a tiny hypervisor (e.g., fewer than 2,000
SLoC) that restricts the code running in kernel space. It is
achieved by virtualizing physical memory to allow SecVisor
to exclusively set hardware memory protection over kernel
memory, which is independent on the memory protection in
the guest machine. In addition, SecVisor also checks certain
kernel states upon mode switch, e.g., return from a system call.
NICKLE is implemented as part of a virtual machine monitor
which allows only authenticated code to be run. Besides the
standard memory for running the operating system, it also
maintains a separate physical memory region called shadow
memory and stores a duplication of authenticated code in this
area. The VMM enforces the guest kernel cannot access the
shadow memory so the integrity of code within this region
is protected. During runtime, NICKLE transparently routes
instruction fetches to this shadow memory and thus blocks
any attempt to execute unauthenticated instructions.
Petroni et al. proposed a state-based control flow in-
tegrity (SBCFI) monitor [32] that detects kernel rootkits by
periodically snapshotting the memory in a VM. It relies on
the assumption that possible desired states of memory are
enumerable. Because of this, in practice, the detection is
mainly effective on invariant (e.g., kernel code) or enumerable
contents (e.g., some global function pointers). However, a
sophisticated attack can remain undetected if it only occurs
between two snapshots, which is a limitation of asynchronous
detection.
Garfinkel et al. first proposed a VMM-based monitor,
called Livewire [2], to mainly protect system invariants. The
Livewire system introduced the VM introspection technique
and is able to check the integrity of kernel code and verify
function pointers with fixed values (e.g., system call table).
Zhang et al. proposed a coprocessor-based kernel moni-
tor [12]. Though it may not have full access to the state of
host processor (e.g., registers), by using an additional piece
of hardware like PCI cryptographic coprocessor, the solution
improves the overall system performance comparing with
VMM-based monitoring. Comparably, Petroni et al. further
proposed a prototype of coprocessor-based kernel monitor
called Copilot [13], which periodically checksums invariant
memory regions and sends reports to a remote administration
station. The autonomous subsystem provided by the coproces-
sor is similar to TrustZone, although the secure world is much
more powerful as detailed in Section III.
Wang et al. built a hardware-assisted tampering detection
framework called HyperCheck for VMMs [14]. HyperCheck
utilized Intel’s System Management Mode (SMM) to reliably
check the state of the VMM and securely communicate to a
remote administration server.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the design and imple-
mentation of SPROBES, an instrumentation mechanism that
enables the secure world to introspect the operating system
running in the normal world. To protect the SPROBES, we
identify a set of five invariants and present an informal proof
of how 12 SPROBES enforce these invariants comprehensively.
By enforcing all five of these invariants, we make a security
guarantee that only approved kernel code is executed even if
the kernel is fully compromised.
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